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PREFAcE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared 
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and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in 
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The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings 
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Abstract
After a slump in cross-border financial flows of capital in the years following the East Asian 
financial crisis, capital flows to developing countries have seen a robust revival in recent years. 
This paper attempts to examine: (i) the factors responsible for this revival and surge in capital 
flows into developing countries; (ii) the qualitative changes in financial integration that are 
accompanying this surge; and (iii) the impact that this surge is having on financial volatility and 
vulnerability, macroeconomic management and growth, in countries that have been “successful” 
in attracting such flows.
It argues that in the wake of financial liberalization that facilitates cross-border flows of capital, 
supply-side factors rather than the financing requirements of developing countries, explain the 
surge. Financial liberalization and the globalization of finance, have also resulted in changes in 
the financial structure – the markets, institutions and instruments that define the global financial 
architecture. Increasingly a small number of centralized financial institutions intermediate global 
capital flows and the investment decisions of a few individuals in these institutions determine the 
nature of the “exposure” of the global financial system. This has implications for the accumulation 
of risk and vulnerability to financial crisis in markets where agents tend to herd.
Associated with this increasing risk, are changes in the business practices and motivations of 
financial firms that reduce the role of finance in ensuring broad-based economic growth. Together 
with the constraints on fiscal, exchange rate and monetary policy set by large capital flows, this 
can limit the prospects of long-run, noninflationary growth as well.ix Global Liquidity and Financial Flows to Developing Countries
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I.  Introduction
After a slump in cross-border flows of capital 
in the years following the East Asian financial cri-
sis, international financial flows have seen a robust 
revival in recent years. The magnitude of cross-
border transactions has grown exponentially during 
the current decade. Further, qualitative changes 
that accompanied this quantitative expansion have 
transformed the nature of the financial integration of 
developing countries with their developed country 
counterparts. 
This paper examines: (i) the factors responsi-
ble for this surge in capital flows into developing 
countries; (ii) the qualitative changes in financial 
integration accompanying this surge; and (iii) the 
impact that this surge is having on financial volatility 
and vulnerability, macroeconomic management and 
growth, in countries that have been “successful” in 
attracting such flows. Besides data from developing 
countries as a group, evidence from one country that 
epitomizes the effects of the recent surge in capital 
flows, viz., India, is used to illustrate the effects that 
recent trends have on macroeconomic policy and 
growth. 
Measuring the absolute size of globally dispersed 
finance capital is indeed a difficult proposition. Given 
the diversity of agents, instruments and markets and 
the lack of transparency in certain over-the-counter 
markets, it is extremely difficult to gauge the size 
of the corpus that functions as international finance. 
Nevertheless, available figures do point to galloping 
growth in the global operations of financial firms. 
One obvious form this has taken since the 
international lending boom of the late 1970s is the 
expansion of operations of international banks in 
less developed countries, especially the so-called 
“emerging markets”. The net result has been an 
increase in the international assets of the big banks 
of the developed world. This trend has only gained 
strength in recent years. At the time of the East Asian 
crisis (mid-1997), the international asset position of 
banks resident in 23 countries reporting to the Bank 
of International Settlements (BIS) stood at $9.95 tril-
lion, involving $8.6 trillion in external assets after 
adjusting for local assets in international currencies 
(BIS, 1997). By June 2007, when 40 countries were 
reporting, this had risen to $33.71 trillion, with ex-
ternal assets totalling $29.98 trillion (BIS, 2007a). 
This expansion in international assets was not only 2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 52
the result of the increase in the number of reporting 
countries.1 The trend was visible in countries that 
reported on both dates as well. For example, the in-
ternational assets of the United Kingdom-based banks 
had increased from $1.5 trillion to $6.1 trillion, and 
that of the United States banks from $0.74 trillion 
to $2.8 trillion.
But this was not all. Increasingly non-bank fi-
nancial firms – pension funds, insurance companies 
and mutual funds – have emerged as important inter-
mediaries between savers and investors. According 
to a Bank of International Settlements study (Com-
mittee on the Global Financial System, 2007: 5), the 
total financial assets of institutional investors stood 
at $46 trillion in 2005. Of this, insurance firms ac-
counted for close to $17 trillion, pension funds for 
$12.8 trillion and mutual funds for $16.2 trillion. The 
United States dominated, accounting for as much as 
$21.8 trillion of institutional investors’ assets, while 
the United Kingdom was far behind at just $4 tril-
lion. Here too, growth has been rapid with total assets 
more than doubling between 1995 and 2005 from 
$10.5 trillion in the United States and $1.8 trillion in 
the United Kingdom. The assets of autonomous pen-
sion funds in the United States, for example, rose from 
$786 billion in 1980 to $1.8 trillion in 1985, $2.7 tril-
lion in 1990, $4.8 trillion in 1995, $7.4 trillion in 2000 
and $8 trillion in 2004 (OECD, 2001; 2003).
Besides these institutions there are other less 
regulated and opaque institutions, particularly highly 
leveraged institutions like hedge funds and private eq-
uity firms, which directly manage financial assets for 
Table 1
DEvElOPING cOUNTRIES AND OThER EMERGING MARkETS:  
ExTERNAl FINANcING, 1997–2006
(Billions of dollars)
1997 1988 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Balance on current account -85.6 -113.4 -21.2 85.8 39.4 77.3 147.6 212.6 428.0 544.2
Net external financing 360.1 265.9 230.7 240.3 182.2 173.5 311.0 479.6 607.0 785.5
Non-debt-creating flows   197.7 185.7 184.8 202.1 171.4 151.3 190.0 283.6 371.1 491.0
Capital transfers 19.8 6.4 9.5 21.0 1.9 -2.5 7.7 8.3 5.6 44.2
Foreign direct investment (FDI)   
and equity 
               
Security liabilities 177.9 179.3 175.3 181.1 169.5 153.8 182.3 275.2 365.5 446.7
Net external borrowing 162.4 50.2 45.9 38.2 10.9 22.2 121.0 196.0 235.9 294.5
Borrowing from official creditors 13.0 42.7 34.5 -8.1 24.1 10.6 0.7 -6.4 -50.9 -64.5
of which:
Credit and IMF loans  3.3 14.0 -2.4 -10.9 19.0 13.4 1.7 -14.9 -39.9 -30.1
Borrowing from banks 9.6 9.4 -13.0 -10.9 -12.5 -18.0 13.8 30.8 40.1 57.8
Borrowing from other 
   private creditors 139.9 28.1 24.3 57.2 -0.8 29.6 106.4 171.6 246.6 301.2
Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Biannual, Statistical Appendices, various issues.
Note:  External financing is defined as the sum of – with opposite sign – the goods and services balance, net income and current 
transfers, direct investment abroad, the change in reserve assets, the net acquisition of other assets (such as recorded private 
portfolio assets, export credit, and the collateral for debt-reduction operations), and the net errors and omissions. Thus, 
net external financing, according to the definition adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), measures the total 
amount required to finance the current account, direct investment outflows, net reserve transactions (often at the discretion 
of the monetary authorities), the net acquisition of non-reserve external assets, and the net transactions underlying the 
errors and omissions (not infrequently reflecting capital flight).3 Global Liquidity and Financial Flows to Developing Countries
high net worth individuals, besides the institutional 
investors themselves. Assets managed by around 
9000 surviving hedge funds are now placed at around 
$1.6 trillion (Financial Stability Forum, 2007). And, 
according to one study, private equity assets under 
management were nearing $400 billion in the United 
States and just under $200 billion in Europe. Private 
equity expansion is also reportedly strong, with ag-
gregate deal value growing at 51 per cent annually 
from 2001 to 2005 in North America.2
Transactions other than in debt and equity by 
these entities have also risen rapidly. In 1992, the 
daily volume of foreign exchange transactions in 
international financial markets stood at $820 billion, 
compared to the annual world merchandise exports 
of $3.8 trillion or a daily value of world merchandise 
trade of $10.3 billion. According to a recent BIS 
report (BIS, 2007b: 5) the average daily turnover 
(adjusted for double-counting) in foreign exchange 
markets rose from $800 billion in 1992 to $1.5 trillion 
in 1998, before declining to $1.2 trillion in 2001. It 
then rose to $1.9 trillion in 2004 and then sharply to 
$3.2 trillion in 2007. With the average GDP generated 
globally in a day standing at close to $100 trillion in 
2003, this appears to be a small 3 per cent relative to 
real economic activity across the globe in that year. 
But the sum involved is huge relative to the daily 
value of world trade. In 2006, the annual value of 
world merchandise exports touched $11.8 trillion, 
while that of commercial services trade rose to 
$2.7 trillion. Thus the daily volume of transactions 
in foreign exchange markets exceeded the annual 
value of trade in commercial services and was close 
to a third of the annual merchandise trade.
More significant is the trade in derivatives. The 
notional value of outstanding over-the-counter de-
rivatives has risen from $169.7 trillion in June 2003 
to $516.4 trillion in June 2007. The BIS estimates 
(BIS, 2007b: 10) that the average daily turnover of 
exchange-traded derivatives rose from $1.4 trillion 
in 1998 to $2.2 trillion in 2001, $4.5 trillion in 2004, 
and $6.2 trillion in April 2007. In the over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives market, average daily turnover 
amounted to another $2 trillion in 2007 at current 
exchange rates (as compared with $1.2 trillion, 
$575 billion and $375 billion respectively in 2004, 
2001, and 1998). Thus total derivatives trading stood 
at $8.2 trillion a day, which together with the $3.2 tril-
lion daily turnover in foreign exchange markets adds 
up to $11.4 trillion. This almost equals the annual 
value of global merchandise exports in 2006.
II.  Flows to developing countries
This massive expansion of finance capital has 
been accompanied by a substantial increase in capital 
flows to developing countries. Net external financing 
flows which had fallen from $360.1 billion in 1997 
to $173.5 billion in 2002, have since risen sharply 
to $785.5 billion in 2006. While foreign direct and 
portfolio investment increased from $153.8 billion in 
2002 to $446.7 billion in 2006, net external borrowing 
rose from $10.9 billion in 2001 to 294.5 billion in 2006. 
Thus, underlying the surge was an expansion in both 
investment and debt flows to developing countries.
Two features considered reassuring are, first, the 
large and dominant share of non-debt creating invest-
ment flows and, second, the dominance of foreign 
direct investment over foreign portfolio investment 
in equity flows. Since direct investment is assumed 
to consist of investment aimed at establishing a pro-
ductive presence in the host country, it is perceived 
as “long term” in nature. This is contrasted with 
portfolio flows often considered “hot money” flows 
looking for quick returns in the stock market.
In actual fact, however, the distinction between 
direct and portfolio investment is more notional than 
real. With countries adopting the IMF definition, any 
investment by a single foreign investor in more than 
10 per cent of the equity of a host country firm is 
defined as direct investment. However, with regula-
tions regarding foreign portfolio investment having 
been relaxed in most developing countries and the 
volume of capital looking for portfolio investment 
opportunities increasing substantially, the number 
of acquisitions motivated by “portfolio investment” 
considerations involving purchases of a more than 
10 per cent equity stake by a single investor has 
increased greatly. These acquisitions, whether made 
through the stock market or through negotiated pur-
chases of stakes in listed or unlisted firms by private 
equity investors, are not necessarily driven by long 
run investment considerations, but by the desire to 
garner large returns from capital gains. Thus, just as 
in the case of portfolio investment and debt, there is 
an element of volatility built into such foreign direct 
investment inflows as well. Do developing countries 
need this capital? While the search for higher interest 
rates and larger capital gains underlies the surge in 
capital flows, these flows are not required by most 
developing countries for balance of payments financ-
ing purposes. Between 2002 and 2006, when external 4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 52
financing to developing countries and emerging mar-
kets (as defined by the IMF) rose from $174 billion 
to $786 billion, developing countries and emerging 
markets as a group (as defined by the IMF) recorded 
consistent current account surpluses, with the surplus 
rising from $77.3 billion to $544 billion. What is 
more, a few developing countries recording either 
small deficits or large surpluses on their current ac-
count received the major share of external financing.
 
The argument that still sounds credible is that 
such flows help finance the investment boom that 
underlies the acceleration of growth in developing 
countries. If the evidence from a successful emerging 
market like India is any indication, there does seem to 
be some basis for this argument. Between 2003–2004 
and 2006–2007, which was a period when foreign 
institutional investor (FII) inflows rose significantly 
and stock markets were buoyant most of the time, 
equity capital mobilized by the Indian corporate sec-
tor rose from Rs 676.22 billion to Rs 1,771.7 billion 
(chart 1).
Not all of this was raised through equity issued 
in the stock market. In fact a predominant and rapidly 
growing share, amounting to a huge Rs 1,455.71 bil-
lion in 2006–2007 was raised in the private placement 
market, involving negotiated sales of chunks of new 
equity in firms not listed in the stock market to fi-
nancial investors of various kinds such as merchant 
banks, hedge funds and private equity firms. While 
not directly part of the stock market boom, such sales 
were encouraged by the high valuations generated by 
that boom and were, as in the case of stock markets, 
made substantially to foreign financial investors. 
One obvious consequence of FII investments in 
stock markets and unlisted firms is that the possibility 
of take-over by foreign entities of Indian firms has 
increased substantially. This possibility of transfer of 
ownership from Indian to foreign individuals or enti-
ties has increased with the private placement boom, 
which is not restrained by the extent of free-floating 
shares available for trading in stock markets. Private 
equity firms can seek out appropriate investment 
targets and persuade domestic firms to part with a 
significant share of equity using valuations that would 
be substantial by domestic wealth standards but not 
so by international standards. Since private equity 
expects to make its returns in the medium term, it 
Chart 1
MObIlIzATION OF cAPITAl ThROUGh EqUITy ISSUES, 1995–2007
Source:  Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2007 . Tables 77 and 82. Available at: http://rbidocs.
rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/DOCs/80257.xls and http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/DOCs/80262.xls. Accessed 
2 January 2008.
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can then wait till policies on foreign ownership are 
adequately relaxed and an international firm is in-
terested in an acquisition in the area concerned. The 
rapid expansion of private equity in India suggests 
that this is the route the private equity business is 
seeking as the potential for such activity in the de-
veloped countries is reaching saturation levels.
However, these trends notwithstanding, foreign 
equity does not account for a significant share of to-
tal corporate finance in the country. In fact, internal 
sources, such as retained profits and depreciation 
reserves, have accounted for a much higher share 
of corporate finance during the equity boom of the 
first half of this decade. According to RBI figures 
(chart 2), internal sources of finance, which accounted 
for about 30 per cent of total corporate financing 
during the second half of the 1980s and the first half 
of the 1990s, rose to 37 per cent during the second 
half of the 1990s and to a record 61 per cent during 
2000–2001 to 2004–2005. Though that figure fell 
during 2005–2006, the last year for which RBI studies 
of company finances are currently available, it still 
stood at a relatively high 56 per cent.
Among the factors explaining the new domi-
nance of internal sources of finance, three are of 
importance. First, increased corporate surpluses, 
resulting from enhanced sales and a combination of 
rising productivity and stagnant real wages. Second, 
a lower interest burden, resulting from the sharp de-
cline in nominal interest rates, compared to the 1980s 
and early 1990s. And third, reduced tax deductions, 
because of tax concessions and loopholes. These fac-
tors have combined to leave more cash in the hands 
of corporations for expansion and modernization.
Along with the increased role for internally gen-
erated funds in corporate financing in recent years, 
the share of equity in all forms of external finance has 
also been declining. An examination of the composi-
tion of external financing (measured relative to total 
financing) shows that the share of equity capital in 
total financing, that had risen from 7 to 19 per cent 
between the second half of the 1980s and the first 
half of the 1990s, subsequently declined by 13 and 
10 per cent respectively during the second half of the 
1990s and the first half of this decade. There, how-
ever, appears to be a revival to 17 per cent of equity 
financing in 2005–2006, possibly as a result of the 
private placement boom of recent times.
What is noteworthy is that, with the decline of 
development banking and therefore of the provision 
Chart 2
SOURcES OF FUNDS FOR INDIAN cORPORATES, 1985–2006
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of finance by such financial institutions (which have 
been converted into commercial banks), the role of 
commercial banks in financing the corporate sector 
has risen sharply to touch 24 per cent of the total 
in 2003–2004. In sum, internal resources and bank 
finance dominate corporate financing, and not equity, 
which receives all the attention because of the surge 
in foreign institutional investment and the media’s 
obsession with stock market buoyancy.
Thus, the surge in foreign financial investment 
is important, more because of the impact that it has 
on the pattern of corporate sector ownership rather 
than the contribution it makes to corporate finance. 
This challenges the defence of the open door policy 
to foreign financial investment on the grounds that 
it helps mobilize resources for investment. It also 
increases the threat of widespread foreign take over 
associated with this policy.
A.	 Supply-side	influences
If the needs or requirements of developing 
countries are not responsible for the surge in capital 
inflows, what are the determining influences? There is 
reason to believe that the capital flows to developing 
countries (before netting out the investment of their 
large reserves in external markets) were driven more 
by supply-side push factors, rather than developing 
country demand. It is undoubtedly true that this capi-
tal could not have crossed borders without relaxed 
regulations regarding the inflow of foreign equity and 
debt in the developing countries. But liberalization 
has not ensured large inflows either in all countries or 
at all times. It appears that an expansion of liquidity 
in the international financial system has driven funds 
into emerging markets, as it did before the debt crisis 
in the early 1980s and the East Asian crisis in 1997.
Markets are liquid when those who hold assets 
can sell them at prices that do not involve significant 
losses, so as to access the finance they need to meet 
other commitments. Given its definition, measur-
ing liquidity is near impossible. But, as is well 
recognized, a market is more liquid when there are 
more investors active in that market. So the volume 
of transactions occurring in markets is an indicator 
of the extent of liquidity in the system. Despite the 
diversified and complex nature of financial markets 
today, the banking sector sits at the centre of the 
financial system, mobilizing and allocating much of 
the capital that goes to determine the overall state of 
liquidity. Based on that perception, researchers have 
used changes in the external or international exposure 
of banks in different reporting countries as indica-
tors of trends in global liquidity (Fornari and Levy, 
2000). Since the debt crisis, the Bank of International 
Settlements has encouraged banks located in differ-
ent countries to report their international exposure 
through an official system, with institutions from 
40 countries currently reporting. As noted earlier, 
the number of reporting countries has increased 
over time making the absolute figures incomparable. 
However, continuous figures are available from 1994 
for 23 reporting countries. 
When we examine these figures it becomes clear 
that there has been a sharp increase in global liquidity 
(as proxied by the international exposure of banks) in 
the period after 2002 (chart 3). Having touched a low 
of $716 billion that year, the exchange rate-adjusted 
changes in the external asset positions of banks in 
these 23 countries registered a more than five-fold 
nominal increase to reach $3.6 trillion in 2006. This 
compares with a previous peak of $1.3 trillion re-
corded in 1997, at the time of the East Asian financial 
crisis. Obviously, with global liquidity increasing 
at this rate, liquidity in the countries in which these 
banks are located rose as well. They are not merely 
recipients of flows from banks located elsewhere, 
but the domestic exposure of banks tends to rise 
with their international exposure, even if the rise in 
cross-border inter-bank flows results in a higher ratio 
of such flows relative to the corresponding measure 
of domestic liquidity.
Experience from previous crises, especially the 
East Asian crisis of 1997, suggests that a rapid expan-
sion of international liquidity results in an increase 
in the proportion of speculative positions taken by 
market participants and a decline in credit quality. 
In particular, increased cross-border flows can be 
accompanied by complex carry trades, with money 
flowing from locations, markets and instruments 
where returns are low to targets offering high returns. 
This can lead to speculative bubbles in one or more 
locations. In addition, cross-border flows increase the 
potential for “contagion” – the international transmis-
sion of the effects of financial instability.
 
For example, apropos 1997, a Bank of Italy 
study found: “In the period between 1995 and 1997, 
global interbank activity expanded rapidly, charac-
terized … by net outflows from Japan. During this 7 Global Liquidity and Financial Flows to Developing Countries
Chart 3
ExchANGE RATE ADjUSTED chANGES IN ExTERNAl POSITIONS  
OF bANkS IN 23 cOUNTRIES, 1994–2006
Source:  Bank of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BIS 
Reporting Banks: Summary of International Positions, various issues. Available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/quarterly.htm.
period, the banking system of the industrial countries 
(excluding Japan) played the role of intermediary in 
the reallocation of flows, having made loans to off-
shore centres that were nearly equal to fund-raising 
from Japan ($50 billion). The flows to emerging 
economies were enormous: $150 billion to banks and 
$130 billion to non-bank agents. Large capital flows 
(around $100 billion) were recorded in favour of 
non-bank agents located in offshore centres, among 
which some non-bank financial intermediaries such 
as hedge funds are also probably included” (Fornari 
and Levy, 2000: 2).
There is reason to believe that similar devel-
opments occurred in the course of the more recent 
liquidity surge. Between June 2003 and June 2007, 
total foreign claims of banks in all reporting countries 
increased by 112 per cent with respect to developed 
countries, 102 per cent with respect to offshore 
centres and 163 per cent with respect to developing 
countries (table 2). There is a high degree of con-
centration of flows to emerging markets in Europe 
and Asia-Pacific. Flows to offshore centres and de-
veloping countries from different developed country 
locations increased by between 100 and 240 per cent 
over this four year period. This implies that though 
instability currently characterizes the market for 
mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities, the 
problems created by excessive liquidity expansion 
affects all favoured investment locations including 
developing countries in Europe and Asia.
Not surprisingly, in the recent surge of capital 
flows to developing countries, almost all emerging 
markets, especially those in Europe and Asia have ex-
perienced increased inflows, with attendant buoyancy 
in their stock and real estate markets. These inflows 
have implied the accumulation of larger speculative 
positions by many investors, including highly lever-
aged ones. One possible indicator of that tendency 
is that, while the outstanding values of all kinds of 
international assets held by banks doubled during 
the recent surge (2003–2007), derivative contracts, 
especially over the counter, have increased by much 
more (table 3).
What this suggests is that the problems arising 
from the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the collat-
eralized debt obligations associated with sub-prime 
loans reflects the unravelling of only one set of 
problems created by the liquidity spiral of recent 
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can still unravel is the excessive exposure, encour-
aged by excess liquidity, of international investors 
and lenders in a few developing countries and the 
securitized assets built on that exposure. That is, a 
supply-side push of capital into the stock, credit and 
real estate markets in emerging market economies 
could have created a second source of fragility in 
the international financial system besides the United 
States sub-prime mortgage market.
This is of significance because the lesson from 
the sub-prime loan crisis is that when suspect loans 
result in payments defaults, those loan assets and 
the securitized obligations that have been built on 
them become suspect as well, resulting in a drying 
up of demand for such assets. Holders of such assets 
who want to sell, even if at a loss, to meet commit-
ments that fall due, find there are no takers, so that 
a financial world, that was till recently awash with 
liquidity suddenly turns illiquid. This has happened 
with only one segment of the market experiencing a 
doubtful loan or investment problem. If the build-up 
of speculative positions in other markets associated 
with the recent surge in liquidity generates new prob-
lem loans and investments, the transformation from 
liquidity excess to liquidity squeeze may be far too 
severe for central bankers and governments to resolve 
without much damage.
Table 2
PERcENTAGE INcREASE IN ExPOSURE TO DIFFERENT lOcATIONS  
by NATIONAlITy OF bANkS, 2003–2007
 Claims vis-à-vis  Total foreign claims Japan United Kingdom United States Other
 All countries  115.5 65.9 122.1 118.1 119.8
 Developed countries  112.0 54.8 122.0 116.0 116.4
 Offshore centres  102.2 105.4 69.8 150.0 110.1
 Developing countries  163.2 118.7 240.5 114.0 165.1
 Africa and Middle East  154.6 88.5 399.7 164.0 98.1
 Asia and Pacific  181.2 111.2 244.2 204.4 169.6
 Europe  267.9 392.4 251.3 192.8 271.9
 Latin America/Caribbean  74.0 74.9 108.6 39.1 82.3
 International organizations  -13.7 .. -71.7 .. 42.3
 Unallocated  -61.0 .. -70.1 .. -60.9
Source:  Computed from data available in Bank of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review: International Banking and 
Financial Market Developments, BIS Reporting Banks: Summary of International Positions, various issues. Available at: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/quarterly.htm.
Table 3
chANGES IN OUTSTANDING POSITIONS FOR 
kEy INTERNATIONAl FINANcIAl ASSETS 
(Billions of dollars)
June 2007 June 2003
Total external asset positions  
  of banks 29 980.5 14 853.8
  Claims on banks 19 094.6 9 663.6
  Claims on non banks 10 886.0 5 190.2
External Loans 21 920.0 11 130.7
International debt securities 20 878.3 10 268.7
International money market 
  instruments 1 114.3 519.3
International bonds and notes 19 764.0 9 749.5
OTC derivatives  
  (notional value) 513 407.0 169 678.0
Exchange-traded derivatives
  Futures 31 676.9 13 930.5
  Options 65 006.7 24 286.6
Source:  Bank of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly 
Review: International Banking and Financial Market 
Developments, BIS Reporting Banks: Summary of In-
ternational Positions, December 2003; December 2007. 
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B.  Determinants of liquidity movements
What needs investigating, therefore, is the set 
of factors that led to the liquidity build up in the first 
place. One factor is, of course a sudden accumulation 
of foreign exchange surpluses with a few countries 
and firms, resulting from the increase in oil prices, 
for example. With these oil surpluses looking for in-
vestment opportunities finding their way to financial 
markets, an excess liquidity syndrome may result. 
In fact, there is a close association between oil price 
movements and the build-up of global liquidity in 
recent years (chart 4). But this is only one fortuitous 
development contributing to liquidity. Moreover, 
since speculation touches commodities as well, the 
direction of causation also moves from liquidity to 
oil prices, as it does the other way around. 
There are three other factors that could have 
played a role in influencing the level of liquidity. 
The first is the long term tendency inherent in the 
dynamic of the contemporary global system for an 
increase in liquidity. The liquidity that drives the 
supply-side push of capital to emerging markets 
originates in the transformation of capitalism that 
has occurred under the tutelage of neoconservative 
ideologies. The growing inequality characterizing 
an unregulated capitalism, in which wages stagnate 
while productivity and profits rise, has resulted in the 
accumulation of vast sums of capital in the hands of 
a few investors in the metropolitan centres of global 
capitalism.3 These gains are lightly taxed by govern-
ments that are not committed to appropriating a part 
of the surpluses of the rich to improve the welfare of 
the poor. Lower down the ladder, investment capi-
tal accumulates with mutual and pension funds in 
which less protected populations deposit the savings 
they put aside to insure their future. The decline of 
state-funded welfare in today’s more liberalized and 
open capitalism is forcing the middle classes in the 
developed countries to save by subscribing to these 
funds that have become important sources of financial 
capital. Financial firms in developed countries lever-
age capital from these sources by borrowing huge 
sums to invest, increasingly in high-risk, high-return 
speculative investments. 
A second reason for the liquidity build-up 
noted by many observers is a tendency in recent 
years for developed country central banks to adopt 
an easy money policy, aimed at encouraging credit-
financed spending in housing and consumer goods 
markets, that keeps consumer demand buoyant and 
GDP growth at “acceptable” levels. Considering the 
United States, which is at the centre of the global 
financial system, while the relationship between 
formal measures of the United States money supply 
(M3 to GDP ratio) and the global liquidity index is 
not perfect, there does appear to be a significantly 
strong positive relation between the United States 
domestic monetary conditions and global liquidity 
in recent years (chart 5).
Third, developing countries adversely affected 
or threatened by the financial crises of 1997–1998 
have since been more cautious about the use of 
foreign exchange. In most cases, this has involved 
maintaining investment rates below domestic savings 
rates to generate current account surpluses in the bal-
ance of payments, or, in the face of current account 
deficits, making sure that not all net capital inflows 
were exhausted through current or capital expendi-
tures. The result has been a huge build up in foreign 
exchange surpluses in developing countries which, 
in myriad ways, find their way to financial centres 
in the developed countries, only to partly return as 
investments in emerging markets. That is, the crisis 
Chart 4
GlObAl lIqUIDITy AND OIl PRIcES,  
1994–2006
Source:  Global liquidity figures from source quoted in chart 3. 
Oil prices from U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion.  Available at: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/
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generated by excess liquidity in the past results in 
an environment that contributes to a new round of 
liquidity accumulation. Chart 6 tracks the relation-
ship between global reserves and global liquidity, and 
shows a strong relationship between the two.
This reverse flow of capital essentially means 
that excess savings in emerging markets are being 
“recycled” in ways that puts the responsibility of 
allocating that capital in the hands of a few financial 
decision makers at the apex of a concentrated global 
financial system. For example, according to reports, 
in the wake of China’s decision to invest part of its 
foreign exchange surpluses in funds managed by the 
Blackstone (private equity) group, much of this capi-
tal flowed back as investment into firms located in 
China itself, feeding a spiral that leaves the problem 
of large surpluses unresolved. More recently, much 
has been made of the rise of sovereign wealth funds 
in developing countries, epitomized by the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), that are seen as a 
challenge to financial institutions from the developed 
countries, especially the United States and the United 
Kingdom, which have traditionally dominated global 
finance. However, a significant part of the invest-
ments by these sovereign wealth funds is in global 
financial intermediaries or the funds they manage.
C.	 Consequences	of	supply-side	capital	flow	
pressures
When liquidity accumulates in the international 
financial system, financial firms are not only under 
pressure to keep money moving to earn returns from 
spreads, but also to “innovate” in order to profit from 
the situation of excess liquidity in the more liberalized 
financial environment of today. One consequence of 
the desire to keep money moving is that, at different 
points in time, one or another group of developing 
countries is discovered as a “favourable” destination 
for foreign financial investors. Increased competi-
tion and falling returns in the developed countries 
are also encouraging financial firms to seek out new 
opportunities in emerging markets. This supply side 
push translates into an actual flow only when devel-
oping countries as a group, including the “emerging 
markets” among them, relax controls on inflows of 
capital and the repatriation of profits and investments 
as well as liberalize their financial systems to attract 
international players and accommodate their oper-
ating strategies. In practice, despite the East Asian 
Chart 5 
GlObAl lIqUIDITy AND RATIO OF M3 TO 
GDP IN ThE UNITED STATES, 1994–2005
Source:  Global liquidity figures from source quoted in chart 3. 
US monetary aggregate M3 from US Federal Reserve 
Board. Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h6/HIST/h6hista.pdf. Accessed 20 December 
2007. (The Federal Reserve discontinued issue of M3 
figures as of 23 March 2006.)
Chart 6 
GlObAl lIqUIDITy AND GlObAl 
 RESERvES, 1994–2006
Source:  Global liquidity figures from source quoted in chart 3. 
Global Reserves (excluding gold) figures from IMF, 
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crisis and similar crises in other parts of the world, 
and the evidence that these crises resulted from more 
open capital accounts, developing countries have 
competed with one another to attract such inflows by 
opting for international financial liberalization.
III.	New	trends	in	capital	flows	to	
developing countries 
Overall, the willingness to accommodate 
supply-side pressures has had rather dramatic im-
plications for capital flows to developing countries. 
The first of these is an acceleration of financial flows 
to developing countries precisely during the years 
when as a group they have been characterized by 
rising current account surpluses. Total flows reached 
a record $571 billion in 2006, having risen by 19 per 
cent after an average growth of 40 per cent during the 
previous three years. Relative to the GDP of these 
countries, total flows, at 5.1 per cent, are at levels 
reached at the time of the East Asian financial crisis 
in 1997–1998 (figures in this section are from World 
Bank, 2007).
A second feature is the acceleration of the long 
term tendency for private flows to dominate official 
(bilateral and multilateral) flows. Private debt and eq-
uity inflows, which had risen by 50 per cent annually 
over the three years ending 2005, increased a further 
17 per cent in 2006 to reach a record $647 billion. 
On the other hand, net official lending has, in fact, 
declined over the last two years, partly because some 
developing countries have chosen to make advance 
repayments of debt owed to official creditors, espe-
cially the IMF and the World Bank (WB). Once flows 
between private lenders and borrowers or private 
investors and firms dominate, the implicit sovereign 
guarantees associated with lending to governments or 
providing government guaranteed credits no longer 
exist, increasing the probability of default.
Third, after a period following the 1997–1998 
crisis when debt flows almost dried up, both equity 
and debt flows to developing countries have risen 
rapidly in recent years. Net private debt and equity 
flows to developing countries have risen from a little 
less than $170 billion in 2002 to close to $647 billion 
in 2006, an almost four-fold increase over a four-year 
period. While net private equity flows, which rose 
from $163 billion to $419 billion, dominated the 
surge, net private debt flows also increased rapidly. 
Bond issues rose from $10.4 billion to $49.3 bil-
lion, and borrowing from international banks from 
$2.3 billion to a huge $112.2 billion. What is more, 
net short-term debt, outflows of which tend to trig-
ger financial crises, rose from around half a billion 
in 2002 to $72 billion in 2006. According to the 
BIS statistics, syndicated loan agreements signed 
by developing country borrowers rose after the im-
mediate post-1997 slump, from $6.9 billion in 2002 
to $237.9 billion in 2006, which compares with the 
previous peak of $129.2 billion in 1997.
The fourth feature, a corollary of these develop-
ments, is the high degree of concentration of flows to 
developing countries, implying excessive exposure in 
a few countries. Ten countries (out of 135) accounted 
for 60 per cent of all borrowing during 2002–2004, 
and that proportion has risen subsequently to three-
quarters in 2006. In the portfolio equity market, flows 
to developing countries were directed at acquiring a 
share in equity either through the secondary market 
or by buying into initial public offers (IPOs). IPOs 
dominated in 2006, accounting for $53 billion of the 
$96 billion in inflows. But here too, there were signs 
of concentration. Four of the 10 largest IPOs were 
by the Chinese companies, accounting for two-thirds 
of total IPO value. Another 3 of the 10 were by the 
Russian companies, accounting for an additional 
22 per cent of total IPO value.
Finally, despite this rapid rise in developing 
country exposure, with the exposure highly concen-
trated in a few countries, the market is still overtly 
optimistic. Ratings upgrades dominate downgrades 
in the bond market. And bond market spreads are 
at unusual lows. This optimism indicates that risk 
assessments are pro-cyclical, underestimating risk 
when investments are booming, and exaggerat-
ing risks when markets turn downwards. But two 
consequences are the herd behaviour of investors in 
developing country markets and their willingness 
to invest a larger volume of money in risky, unrated 
instruments.
In sum, we are now witnessing a return to a 
period when large and rising inflows, herd behaviour 
and over exposure have come to characterize capital 
flows from the North to the South. Is there reason to 
believe that – unlike in 1997, say – this time around, 
these developments are benign, or even positive, from 
the point of view of the developing countries, as some 
would suggest? Besides the many crises that have 
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Argentina and Turkey, during the decade since 1997, 
structural changes in the global financial system 
suggest that risk, including systemic risk, has only 
increased. And the experience with the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis suggests that even in developed 
countries, the regulatory framework has not evolved 
to match the complexity of markets, institutions 
and instruments that characterize today’s financial 
systems, and prudential regulation, new disclosure 
norms and changed accounting practices have not 
been successful in identifying fragility before it is 
too late.
A.  Structural transformation of global 
finance
This experience matters because of evidence 
that the rapid rise of capital flows to developing 
countries has been associated with the increasing 
dominance of the global financial architecture by 
a few institutions, which are present in almost all 
countries. During the 1990s, the three-decade long 
process of proliferation and rise to dominance of 
finance in the global economy reached a new phase. 
Financial consolidation saw greater concentration of 
financial activity and decision making in a few or-
ganizations. And financial integration joined hitherto 
demarcated areas of financial activity that had been 
dissociated from each other to ensure transparency, 
check conflicts of interest and discourage unsound 
financial practices.
A study (Group of 10, 2001) of financial con-
solidation commissioned by finance ministers and 
central bank governors of the Group of 10 found, 
as expected, a high level of merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity in the study countries during the 
1990s, with an acceleration of such activity in the last 
three years of that decade. The number of acquisitions 
by financial firms from the survey countries increased 
from around 337 in 1990 to between 900 and 1000 
by the end of the decade. Further, the average value 
of each of these acquisitions increased from $224 
million in 1990 to $649 million in 1999. Clearly, 
M&As in the financial sector were creating large and 
complex financial organizations in the international 
financial system.
Further, over the 1990s as a whole the evi-
dence seems to be that M&A activity was largely 
industry-specific, with banking firms tending to 
merge dominantly with other banks. However, the 
pattern was changing over time. While in 1994 there 
was one instance of cross-industry M&A for every 
five instances of intra-industry mergers, the ratio 
had come down to one in every three by 1999. The 
mergers and acquisitions drive within the financial 
sector was not merely creating large and powerful or-
ganizations, but firms that increasingly straddled the 
financial sector. Exploiting the process of financial 
liberalization, these firms were breaking down the 
Chinese walls that had been built between different 
segments of the financial sector.
With growing financial liberalization in the 
developing world, it was inevitable that this process 
would affect developing countries as well. According 
to a study by the Committee on the Global Finan-
cial System (CGFS, 2004), there has been a surge 
in foreign direct investment in the financial sectors 
of developing countries. The study, by using cross-
border M&As targeting banks in emerging market 
economies (EMEs), found that cross-border deals 
involving financial institutions from EMEs as tar-
gets, which accounted for 18 per cent of such M&A 
deals worldwide during 1990–1996, rose to 30 per 
cent during 1997–2000. The value of financial sector 
FDI rose from about $6 billion during 1990–1996 
to $50 billion during the next four years. Such FDI 
peaked at $20 billion in 2001, declined sharply in 
2002, but stabilized in 2003. The net result is a clear 
shift in the ownership of the financial sector (table 4). 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that this figure has risen 
sharply since.
With respect to Asia, CGFS found that: “The 
proportion of cross-border M&As in East Asia’s fi-
nancial sector initially was small compared with other 
regions. The value of cross-border M&As targeting 
non-Japan Asian countries was $14 billion or 17% of 
the total during 1990–2003. Asia, however, has been 
one of the fastest growing target regions for M&A, 
with a sizeable jump in cross-border M&A activity 
occurring in Korea and Thailand. In addition, there 
has been a large number of small-value cross-border 
M&A transactions in the finance sector between East 
Asian economies. In 2003, Asia received the largest 
share of FSFDI inflows.”
Besides liberalization and the high returns in 
hitherto protected financial markets, financial crises 
also favoured globalization. As the CGFS study 
notes: “A standard response to crises by EME gov-
ernments, encouraged by the international financial 13 Global Liquidity and Financial Flows to Developing Countries
institutions, was to accelerate financial liberalization 
and to recapitalize banks with the help of foreign 
investors. This was the case in Latin America in 
the years following the 1994 Mexican crisis.” In 
Asia also, most governments liberalized the terms 
of foreign entry and ownership after the crisis, but 
the major role played by governments in the recapi-
talization of banks delayed the expansion of foreign 
presence.
Thus, the global financial system is clearly 
characterized by a high degree of centralization. With 
the United States financial institutions intermediating 
global capital flows, the investment decisions of a few 
individuals in a few institutions virtually determines 
the nature of the “exposure” of the global financial 
system. The growing presence of a few consolidated 
global players in the developing countries has im-
plications for the accumulation of risk in markets 
Table 4
OwNERShIP STRUcTURE IN ThE bANkING SySTEMS OF EMERGING MARkET EcONOMIES
a
1990 2002  b
Domestic    Foreign Domestic     Foreign
   Private  c Government    Private Government
Asia
China 0 100 0 98 2d
Hong Kong, China 11 0 89 28 72
Indonesia .. .. 4 37 51 13
India 4 91 5 12 80 8
Korea, Republic of 75 21 4 62 30 8
Malaysia .. .. .. 72 18
Philippines 84 7 9 70 12 18
Singapore 11 0 89 24 0 76
Thailand 82 13 5 51 31 18
Latin America
Argentina .. 36e 10 f 19 33 48
Brazil 30 64 6 27 46 27
Chile 62 19 19 46 13 42
Mexico 1 97 2 18 0 82
Peru 41 55 4 43 11 46
Venezuela 93 6  g 1g 39 27 34
Central and Eastern Europe
Bulgaria .. .. 0 20 13 67
Czech Republic 12e 78e 10e 14 4 82
Estonia .. .. .. 1 0 99
Hungary 9 81 10 11 27 62
Poland 17g 80g 3g 10 17 63
Russian Federation .. .. 6 23 68 9
Slovakia .. .. 0 9 5 85
Source:  Committee on the Global Financial System, 2004, table 1, page 9.
a  Percentage share of total bank assets. 2002 figures for Central and Eastern Europe: percentage share of regulatory capital. 
b  Data are shown for the latest year available, which is mainly 2002. 
c  Calculated as residual. 
d  1999.
e  1994.
f  Average of 1988–1993. 
g  1993.
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where agents tend to herd. Unfortunately, unregulated 
entities making huge profits on highly speculative 
investments are at the core of that system.
B.	 Hedge	funds	and	private	equity	firms
Liberalization has not just increased consolida-
tion and the global integration of the banking industry 
in developing countries. Many are now home to 
the activities of institutions like hedge funds and 
private equity firms that are loosely regulated in the 
developed countries, highly leveraged and pursue 
unconventional, speculative and risky investment 
strategies in relatively illiquid assets aimed at exploit-
ing mispricing and arbitrage opportunities to ensure 
high returns for their investors. With investment 
banks and fund managers adopting practices similar 
to these entities, the distinction between these and 
other financial institutions is blurring at the level 
of activity, except perhaps for the concentration of 
the activities of these entities on specific kinds of 
trades. 
While controversial for long, hedge funds 
gained notoriety in 1992 when George Soros’ Quan-
tum Fund was held responsible for the speculative 
attack on the British pound, and in the late 1990s, 
with the collapse of the much publicized Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) with its star traders, 
Nobel-winning economists and high-return track 
record. For developing countries, their notoriety was 
linked to their alleged role in the currency speculation 
that precipitated the 1997–1998 crisis.
Yet, hedge fund activity in developing countries 
has increased substantially in recent years, including 
in Asia. Encouraged by liberalization, that ensures 
not only entry, but the proliferation of instruments, 
the growth of derivatives markets, the emergence of 
futures, and the increase in “shorting” possibilities, 
these firms have devoted much attention to these 
markets. According to one estimate quoted by the 
Financial Stability Forum (2007), the share of hedge 
fund assets managed in Asia has risen from 5 per 
cent in 2002 to 8 per cent in 2006. These increases 
have been at the expense of the United States, which 
while recording a significant increase in hedge fund 
activity in absolute terms, has seen a decline in its 
share of the global total from more than 80 per cent 
in 2002 to about 65 per cent in 2006.
Besides hedge funds, portfolio diversification 
by financial investors in developed countries seeking 
new targets, higher returns and/or hedges has, over 
the last quarter of a century, seen a revival of private 
equity firms. Private equity, as originally broadly 
defined, involves investment in equity linked to an 
asset not listed and therefore not publicly traded in 
stock markets. Given this broad definition, a range 
of transactions and/or assets fall under its purview, 
including venture capital investments, leveraged 
buyouts and mezzanine debt financing, where the 
creditor expects to gain from the appreciation in 
equity value by exploiting conversion features such 
as rights, warrants or options.
While private equity has been growing rapidly, 
its activities in developed countries is being curbed by 
growing opposition to these firms and their activities. 
A major criticism of private equity firms is their lack 
of transparency. Besides, they are being accused of 
wielding the hatchet against workers or breaking up 
companies by restructuring firms. 
One result of all this is that private equity firms 
are finding it harder to conduct business in the United 
States and Europe. Not surprisingly, the business is 
increasingly moving overseas, especially to emerging 
market countries where markets are booming because 
of foreign institutional investment inflows. 
According to the Emerging Markets Private 
Equity Association (EMPEA, 2006), fundraising for 
emerging market private equity surged in 2005 and 
2006. Estimated at $3.4 billion in 2003 and $5.8 bil-
lion in 2004, the figure shot up to $22.1 billion in 
2004 and $21.9 billion in the period to 1 November 
during 2006. Asia (excluding Australia, Japan and 
New Zealand) dominated the surge, with the figure 
rising from $2.2 billion in 2003 and $2.8 billion in 
2004 to $15.4 billion in 2005 and $14.5 billion during 
the first ten months of 2006. 
Deal-making in developing countries has also 
gained momentum. Dealogic estimates (Metrics 2.0, 
2006) that the value of private equity deals in the Asia 
Pacific, excluding Japan, more than tripled to $26 bil-
lion in 2006 from $7 billion in 2005. Private equity 
buyouts have accounted for 7 per cent of regional 
merger and acquisition volume in 2006, up from 3 per 
cent in 2005, but still below the global figure of 17 per 
cent. While Australia accounted for $11.7 billion in 
activity, deals in the Indian sub-continent jumped 
to $3.1 billion in 2006 from $764 million in 2005, 15 Global Liquidity and Financial Flows to Developing Countries
with Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.’s $900 million 
purchase of Flextronics Software Systems, India’s 
largest deal. East Asia deals totalled $10.4 billion, led 
by Goldman Sachs’ $2.6 billion investment in Indus-
trial and Commercial Bank of China, 2007’s biggest 
regional deal. Investment banks raked in $304 million 
in net revenue from private equity investors in 2006, 
compared with $239 million in 2005.
C.	 Transformation	of	the	financial	sector
The increased foreign presence in the finan-
cial sector in developing countries has meant that 
capital flows are accompanied by the movement of 
firms and institutions from developed to developing 
countries. Countries wanting to attract financial in-
vestments have to accommodate financial investors 
as well. Further, when these entities are permitted 
to enter developing country markets, they would 
want to replicate their business practices in the new 
environment. Policies of financial liberalization 
are, inter alia, meant to meet these requirements of 
finance capital in countries seeking to attract finan-
cial investments. Financial liberalization therefore: 
(i) opens the country to new forms and larger volumes 
of international financial flows; (ii) allows entry of 
foreign financial entities, varying from banks to pri-
vate equity firms, into the country; and (iii) dilutes 
or dismantles regulations and controls the operations 
of financial entities and the pursuit of their preferred 
practices. A consequence of such liberalization is 
financial consolidation and the proliferation of new 
institutions and instruments. It has been argued for 
some time now, especially since the East Asian crisis, 
that financial liberalization, involving liberalization 
of controls on inflows and outflows of capital respec-
tively, has increased financial fragility in developing 
countries, making them more vulnerable to periodic 
financial and currency crises.
Analyses of individual instances of crises have 
tended to conclude that the nature and timing of 
these crises have had much to do with the shift to 
a more liberal and open financial regime. What is 
less emphasized is the vulnerability that stems from 
the proliferation of new kinds of foreign institu-
tions, new instruments and new business practices 
in the wake of liberalization. The increased extent 
of liberalization over the last decade has not only 
led to the surge in capital flows in recent years, but 
also encouraged the entry of speculative investors 
adopting unusual lending and investment practices 
in environments even less regulated than the United 
States. This would, therefore, have substantially in-
creased, rather than reduced, financial vulnerability 
over the last decade.
Lessons from the United States sub-prime crisis
The United States sub-prime mortgage crisis 
illustrates how underlying such vulnerability is the 
financial entanglement which results from the layered 
financial structure, “innovative” financial products 
and inadequate financial regulation associated with 
the increasingly liberalized and globalized financial 
system in most countries. Few would deny that the 
source of the crisis in the sub-prime housing loan 
market in the United States – consisting of loans to 
borrowers with a poor credit record – is the way in 
which the preceding housing market and consump-
tion booms were triggered and sustained. Housing 
demand grew rapidly because of easy access to 
credit, with credit extended to borrowers considered 
less than creditworthy. These sub-prime borrowers 
were offered credit at higher rates of interest, made 
attractive by special offers and unusual financing 
arrangements – with little documentation or self-
certification of income, little or no down payment, 
extended repayment periods and structured payment 
schedules involving low interest rates in the initial 
phases which were “adjustable” and moved sharply 
upwards when “reset” to reflect premia on market 
interest rates. All this encouraged high-risk borrowers 
to take on loans they could ill understand, let alone 
afford, either because they did not fully understand 
the payment burdens they were taking on, expected to 
profit from the booming property market, or expected 
their incomes to rise sufficiently to cope with their 
new debt burden. Clearly, the problem is largely a 
supply-side creation driven by factors such as easy 
liquidity, low interest rates and “debt-pushing” efforts 
by lending institutions competing for new business. 
In these circumstances, mortgage brokers attracted 
clients by relaxing income documentation require-
ments or offering early grace periods with low or no 
payments, after which higher rates would kick in. 
As a result, the share of such sub-prime loans in all 
mortgages rose sharply. Estimates vary, but accord-
ing to Inside Mortgage Finance quoted by the New 
York Times (Creswell and Bajaj, 2007), sub-prime 
loans reached $600 billion in 2006, or 20 per cent of 
the mortgage loan total as compared with just 5 per 
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The increase in this type of credit occurred be-
cause of the complex nature of current-day finance 
that allows an array of agents to earn lucrative returns, 
even while transferring the risk associated with the 
investments that offer these returns. Mortgage bro-
kers seek out and find willing borrowers for a fee, 
taking on excessive risk while in search of volume. 
Mortgage lenders finance these mortgages, not with 
the intention of actually garnering the interest and 
amortization flows associated with such lending, 
but in order to sell on these mortgages to Wall Street 
banks and other investors in collateralized securities. 
The Wall Street banks buy these mortgages because 
they can bundle assets with varying returns to create 
securities or collateralized debt obligations, involving 
tranches with differing probabilities of default and dif-
ferential protection against losses. They charge hefty 
fees for structuring these products and having them 
rated with complex mathematical models, before sell-
ing them to a range of investors such as banks, mutual 
funds, pension funds and insurance companies. These 
entities in turn, can then create a portfolio involving 
varying degrees of risk and different streams of future 
cash flows linked to the original mortgages. Firms like 
the unregulated hedge funds make speculative invest-
ments in derivatives of various kinds in search of high 
returns for their high net worth investors. Needless 
to say, institutions at every level are not fully devoid 
of risk, but these risks are shared and rest in large 
measure with the final investors in the chain.
This structure is relatively stable so long as 
defaults are a small proportion of the total. But if the 
proportion of defaults increases, as the share of sub-
prime mortgages in the total rises, the bottom of the 
barrel gives, and all assets become less liquid. Rising 
foreclosures adversely affect property prices and sale-
ability as foreclosed assets are put up for sale as credit 
is squeezed because lenders turn wary. And securities 
built on these mortgages turn illiquid because there are 
few buyers for assets whose values are opaque since 
there is no ready market for them. Consequently, for 
example, a leading Wall Street bank like Bear Stearns 
has to declare that investments in two funds it created 
linked to mortgage-backed securities were worthless. 
The investors themselves have to sell-off other assets 
to rebalance their portfolios, sending ripples into mar-
kets such as those in developing countries that have 
little to do with the United States sub-prime market.
The problem is not restricted to the Wall Street 
banks. For example, in early August 2007, the French 
bank BNP Paribas suspended withdrawals from three 
of its funds exposed to the mortgage-backed securities 
market. The bank reportedly attributed its decision 
to “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain 
market segments”, which constrained it from meeting 
withdrawal demands that could have turned into a run 
on the fund. In some cases, a bail-out became neces-
sary, as was true of the Düsseldorf-based Deutsche 
Industriebank AG (IKB), which, through offshore 
front company Rhineland Funding, had invested as 
much as $17.5 billion in asset-backed securities. As 
the value of its assets fell, Rhineland had to call on 
a €12 billion line of credit that it had negotiated with 
a group of banks, including Deutsche Bank, besides 
IKB itself. Deutsche Bank decided to opt out of its 
promise to lend, resulting in the discovery that the 
Fund had suffered huge losses and needed a bail-out 
led by state owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW). In the United Kingdom, Northern Rock, a 
top mortgage lending bank that began as a housing 
society, incurred losses in the sub-prime market and 
became the target of a bank run. Worried depositors 
began pulling out their money, forcing the Bank of 
England to intervene because of fears that the run 
would spread to other banks. In sum, the effects of 
the sub-prime crisis weakened distant segments of 
the global financial system, as a result of financial 
entanglement.
Entanglement also makes nonsense of the theory 
that a complex financial system with multiple insti-
tutions, securitization, proliferating instruments and 
global reach is safer because it spreads risk. This is 
illustrated by the example of IKB referred to above. 
Banks wanting to reduce the risk they carry resort 
to securitization to transfer this risk. But institutions 
created by the banks themselves, linked to them in 
today’s more universalized banking system or lever-
aged with bank finance, often buy the very instruments 
created to transfer risk. In the event, as The Economist 
(“Prime Movers” 11 August 2007) put it, “banks (that) 
have shown risk out of the front door by selling loans, 
only ... let it return through the back door.” This, it 
notes, is exactly what transpires in the relationship 
between the three major Wall Street firms – Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Bear Sterns – that offer 
prime broking services, including loans, to highly 
leveraged institutions like hedge funds. The bail-out 
of LTCM in 1998 was necessitated because of such 
entanglement involving all the leading merchant 
(investment) banks.
Investments by banks, pension funds and mutual 
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high and quick returns in a world of excess liquidity. 
In deciding to invest in structured products intermedi-
ated at different levels, these institutions, ill-equipped 
to judge the true value and risk of these assets, rely 
on rating agencies. But their ratings have turned 
out to be unreliable and pro-cyclical, serving as er-
roneous and pro-cyclically adjusted signals. Noting 
that “in a matter of weeks thousands of portions of 
subprime debt issued as recently as 2005 and 2006 
have had their ratings slashed”, The Economist (“Sold 
down the river Rhine”, 11 August 2007) noted that 
investors should not have trusted the original ratings 
because “the rating agencies were earning huge fees 
for providing favourable judgments”. What is more, 
even when there is no deception involved, rating 
agencies themselves are not well equipped to assess 
these products, and rely on information and models 
provided by the creators of the products themselves. 
Once an asset is rated, there is much reluctance to 
downgrade it, because it would raise doubts about 
related ratings and trigger sell-offs that may affect the 
prices of related securities that may in turn warrant 
further downgrades.
There are many lessons being driven home by 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis of particular signifi-
cance for developing countries rapidly liberalizing 
their financial systems. First, easy liquidity in a 
loosely controlled financial system, which encour-
ages the flow of capital to developing countries, 
facilitates speculative and unsound financial prac-
tices that increase fragility. Second, such practices 
are encouraged by the “financial innovation” that 
liberalization encourages, which often increases the 
layers of intermediation and allows firms to transfer 
risk. As a result, those who create risky “products” 
in the first instance are less exposed to or worried 
about the risk involved than they should be. Third, 
as the product moves up the financial chain, inves-
tors are less sure about the risk and value of these 
products than they should be, rendering even low 
risk, first-stage tranches prone to value loss. Fourth, 
this inadequate knowledge appears to be true even of 
the rating agencies on whose ratings investors rely, 
resulting in misleading and pro-cyclical ratings and 
belated adjustments. This implies that as and when 
a rating downgrade does occur, the asset becomes 
worth much less, since nobody is willing to buy the 
asset without large discounts. Fifth, new forms of 
self-regulation appear to be poor substitutes for more 
rigorous control, since the current crisis originates 
in a country whose financial sector is considered the 
most sophisticated, well regulated and transparent 
and serves as a model for others reforming their 
financial sectors. And finally, financial globalization 
and entanglement imply that countries that have more 
open and integrated financial systems are more prone 
to contagion effects, even if the virus originates in 
remote locations and markets. These are lessons 
that must inform policy in these so-called emerging 
markets.
Signs of vulnerability
If a supply-side driven surge in liquidity in-
creased vulnerability in the United States, it would 
be much more difficult for developing countries with 
even poorer regulatory systems seeking to emulate 
the Anglo-Saxon financial model not to be vulner-
able. One obvious indicator of such an increase in 
vulnerability is the massive “boom” in their stock 
markets that emerging markets across the Asian 
region have been experiencing (see annex charts). 
Market observers, the financial media and a range 
of analysts agree that foreign investments have been 
an important force, even if not always the only one, 
driving markets to unprecedented heights. 
There are a number of reasons why this trend 
exacerbates vulnerability. To start with, the spike 
in stock prices is usually sharp i.e. very temporary. 
Second, this boom is generalized and occurs inde-
pendently of the relative economic performance of 
the country concerned. This not only implies that 
fundamentals do not have the prime role in determin-
ing the behaviour of markets, but also means that the 
danger of contagion is real. Third, this occurs both in 
countries where investors have burnt their fingers in 
1997–1998 and in those where they did not.
A second indicator of vulnerability is the revival 
of the credit spiral, which underlay the East Asian 
crisis. It was undoubtedly true that in the years im-
mediately following the crisis, the flow of private 
non-guaranteed debt to developing countries as a 
group fell until 2000 and registered a marginal decline 
in the subsequent two years to 2002 (table 5). With 
governments wanting to discourage debt-dependence, 
and creditors wary of lending any further, even public 
and publicly guaranteed debt from private creditors 
sharply declined during those years. But matters seem 
to have changed dramatically over the last four years. 
The flow of non-guaranteed debt from private sources 
into developing countries increased by 250 per cent 
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governments too seem to have overcome their fear 
of debt with public or publicly guaranteed debt from 
private creditors having risen by more than 150 per 
cent. In sum, creditors appear willing to lend, and 
debtors willing to borrow, resulting in an aggregate 
scenario that spells debt dependence of a much larger 
magnitude than before the 1997 crisis.
There has been some change in composition 
by source as well. While in the immediate aftermath 
of the 1997–1998 crisis, the relatively small inflow 
of debt was due to bond issues by developing coun-
tries, with bank credit contracting, in more recent 
years there has been a revival of bank credit. The 
corporate share of external debt has risen from less 
than one-fifth of the total in the late 1990s to more 
than half in 2006. 
What is disturbing is the extreme concentration 
of these flows, with a growing and now substantial 
share of it flowing to Europe and Central Asia. In 
2006, 57 per cent of flows of private non-guaranteed 
debt went to this region, while East Asia and the 
Pacific received 14 per cent, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean 19 per cent. Just 10 countries ac-
counted for three-quarters of all borrowing in 2006, 
a sharp increase from the already high 60 per cent 
average during 2002–2004. What is more, the evi-
dence points to a growing share of lending to banks 
in developing countries, interested in exploiting the 
lower interest rates in international – as opposed 
to domestic – markets. Loan commitments to the 
banking sector totalled $32 billion in 2006, which 
exceeded commitments to the oil and gas sector, a 
traditional leader.
Finally, the World Bank Global Development 
Finance 2007 noted a decline in credit quality accom-
panying these developments. To quote: “As private 
debt flows swell, riskier borrowers may be taking a 
larger share of the market. The share of bonds issued 
by unrated (sovereign and corporate) borrowers rose 
from 10 percent in 2000 to 37 percent in 2006, and 
the share of unsecured loans in total bank lending 
rose from 50 percent in 2002 to almost 80 percent 
in 2006” (World Bank, 2007: 47).
However, despite these disconcerting trends, 
creditor confidence is at a high. The average spread 
between interest rates charged on developing country 
loan commitments and the benchmark LIBOR fell 
from more than 200 basis points in 2002 to 125 in 
2006, as average loan maturities have become 
longer.
The inevitable conclusion from this evidence 
that needs explaining is that creditors are not pric-
ing risk adequately and taking it into account when 
determining exposure. One explanation could be that 
creditor profiles have changed significantly, with the 
entry of intermediaries, such as hedge funds and other 
less risk-averse entities, into the credit market. The 
other could be the growing role of credit derivatives, 
which allows for risk pooling and the transfer of risk 
to entities less capable of assessing them.
According to the Financial Times, “The outstand-
ing notional volume of credit derivatives contracts has 
doubled every year since the start of this decade to 
reach $26,000bn in the middle of last year. This has 
led many traditional credit investors to rethink their 
strategies. But above all, it has triggered a sharp 
increase in the number and scale of credit-focused 
hedge funds. In 1990, according to Hedge Fund Re-
search (HFR), hedge funds focused on fixed income 
strategies accounted for just over 3 per cent of the 
$39bn of assets under management in the industry. 
By the end of last year, a more varied array of credit-
related strategies accounted for almost 7.5 per cent 
of a $1,400bn industry – and that does not include 
convertible bond arbitrage. Similarly, the volume of 
assets under management in fixed-income arbitrage 
Table 5
PRIvATE cREDIT TO DEvElOPING 
cOUNTRIES, 1998–2006
(Billions of dollars)
Bonds Banks Others Short-term Total
1998 38.8 49.4 -5.3 -65.3 17.6
1999 30.1 -5.3 -1.5 -17.3 6.0
2000 20.9 -3.8 -3.7 -6.3 7.1
2001 10.3 7.8 -6.5 -23.7 -12.1
2002 10.4 2.3 -6.9 0.5 6.3
2003 24.7 14.5 -4.4 55.0 89.8
2004 39.8 50.6 -4.0 68.4 154.8
2005 55.1 86.0 -4.9 67.7 203.9
2006e  49.3 112.2 -5.5 72.0 228.0
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strategies alone, which seek to exploit price differ-
ences between related bonds and rely heavily on 
derivatives, has leapt from $5.8bn in 2001 to $41bn 
at the end of 2006, according to HFR” (Davies and 
Beales, 2007). Since these developments are also 
taking place in the emerging markets, hedge funds 
are looking for roles there as well.
These two aspects are indeed related. The 
emergence of credit derivatives has rendered credit 
assets tradable, attracting those looking for quick 
or early profits. But even here, financial innovation 
has played a role. Until recently, other than banks, 
the major players in the credit business were pen-
sion funds and insurers. But with equities proving 
to be inadequately remunerative investments, banks 
increasingly geared to creating new instruments 
based on debt, and credit derivatives offering liquid 
credit instruments, new players – hedge funds and 
pension funds – have emerged as investors, and new 
operators – specialized credit funds and managers 
of collateralized debt obligations – have emerged as 
providers of instruments.
In sum, a decade after the 1997–1998 crisis we 
are witnessing trends which imply an increase in 
financial fragility that can lead to further financial 
crises, with adverse implications for growth, stability, 
employment and social welfare. This is the element of 
continuity in a world that is seen as having changed 
substantially. Self-regulation clearly does not help. 
New measures to govern finance and financial flows 
are needed.
D.  Macroeconomic fall-out of the capital 
surge
Besides increasing fragility and vulnerability, 
the surge in capital flows to developing countries is 
making the macroeconomic management of these 
economies increasingly difficult, with potentially 
adverse implications for development. The growing 
presence of foreign capital is disconcerting, not just 
because such flows are in the nature of “hot money” 
which renders the financial sector fragile, but because 
efforts to attract such flows and accommodate surges 
in such flows have macroeconomic implications. 
To start with, inasmuch as financial liberaliza-
tion leads to financial growth and deepening and 
increases the presence and role of financial agents in 
the economy, it forces the state to adopt a deflation-
ary stance to appease financial interests. Deflation 
follows because financial interests favour tax cuts, 
but oppose deficit financing for a number of reasons. 
First, deficit financing is said to increase the liquid-
ity overhang in the system, and therefore as being 
potentially inflationary. Inflation is anathema to fi-
nance since it erodes the real value of financial assets. 
Second, since government spending is “autonomous” 
in character, the use of debt to finance such autono-
mous spending is seen as introducing into financial 
markets an arbitrary player not driven by the profit 
motive, whose activities can render interest rate dif-
ferentials – that determine financial profits – more 
unpredictable. Third, if deficit spending leads to a 
substantial build-up of the state’s debt and interest 
burden, it may intervene in financial markets to lower 
interest rates, with implications for financial returns. 
Financial interests wanting to guard against that pos-
sibility tend to oppose deficit spending. Finally, the 
use of deficits to finance autonomous expenditures 
by the state amounts to an implicit legitimization of 
a proactive and interventionist state and a de-legiti-
mization of the market. Since finance generally seeks 
to de-legitimize the state and legitimize the market, 
it strongly opposes deficit-financed, autonomous 
state spending.
Efforts to curb the deficit under a lenient tax 
regime obviously result in a contraction of public 
expenditure, especially state investment, which ad-
versely affects growth and employment; curtails social 
sector expenditures that sets back the battle against 
deprivation; impacts adversely on food and other 
subsidies that benefit the poor; and sets off a scramble 
to privatize profit-earning public assets, which render 
the self-imposed fiscal strait-jacket self-perpetuating. 
All the more so since the finance-induced pressure 
to limit deficit spending is institutionalized through 
legislation which constitutionally binds the state to 
eliminating revenue deficits and limiting fiscal defi-
cits to low, pre-specified levels.
E.  Implications of curbing the monetized 
deficit
This macroeconomic fall-out and its effects 
are aggravated by the perception that accompanies 
the financial reform that macroeconomic regulation 
should rely on monetary policy pursued by an “in-
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The immediate consequence of this perception is the 
tendency to follow the principle that even the limited 
deficits should not be “monetized”. Fiscal reform 
was not only concerned with reducing the size of the 
deficit, but also with the manner in which any given 
deficit should be financed. In this regard, fiscal reform 
involved a sharp reduction of the “monetized deficit” 
of the government and its subsequent elimination. 
In many countries, this shift away from low-interest 
borrowing from the central bank has resulted in a 
sharp rise in the average interest rate for government 
borrowing, worsening the fiscal problem. This shift, 
it is argued, is essential for giving the central bank a 
degree of autonomy, and monetary policy a greater 
role in the economy. This understanding, in turn, 
stems from the premise that monetary policy should 
have a greater role than fiscal manoeuvrability in 
macroeconomic management. 
The question that remains, therefore, is whether 
this “abolition” of the monetized deficit in order to ap-
pease financial capital actually results in central bank 
independence. It does not if the country is successful 
in attracting capital leading to a rapid increase in the 
level of its foreign exchange reserves. Reserve accu-
mulation is the result of pressure on the central bank 
to purchase foreign currency to shore up demand for 
and dampen the effects on the domestic currency of 
excess supplies of foreign currency. 
In India’s liberalized foreign exchange markets, 
for example, excess supply leads to an appreciation 
of the rupee, which in turn undermines the competi-
tiveness of India’s exports. Since improved export 
competitiveness and increased exports are leading 
objectives of economic liberalization, the persistence 
of a tendency towards rupee appreciation implies that 
the reform process is inherently contradictory. Not 
surprisingly, the central bank and the government 
have been keen to dampen, if not stall, appreciation. 
Thus, the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI’s) holding 
of foreign currency reserves has been rising with the 
surge in capital inflows.
Unfortunately, the RBI’s ability to persist with 
this policy without eroding its ability to control do-
mestic money supply is increasingly under threat. 
Increases in the foreign exchange assets of the central 
bank amount to an increase in reserve money, and 
therefore in money supply, unless the RBI manages 
to neutralize increased reserve holding by retrenching 
other assets. If that does not happen, the overhang of 
liquidity in the system increases substantially, affect-
ing the RBI’s ability to pursue its monetary policy 
objectives. Till recently, the RBI has been avoiding 
this problem through its sterilization policy, which 
involves the sale of its holdings of central government 
securities to match increases in its foreign exchange 
assets. But even this option has now more or less 
run out. Net Reserve Bank Credit to the government, 
reflecting the RBI’s holding of government securities, 
fell from Rs 1,673.08 billion at the end of May 2001 
to Rs 46.26 billion by December 10, 2004. With its 
stock of government securities deteriorating, there 
was little by way of sterilization instruments avail-
able with the RBI. To partly deal with this problem, 
the government launched a Market Stabilization 
Scheme in April 2004. Under the scheme, the RBI 
is permitted to issue government securities for steri-
lization operations, the timing, volume, tenure and 
terms of which are at its discretion. The ceiling on 
the maximum amount of such securities that can be 
outstanding at any given point in time is decided 
periodically through consultations between the RBI 
and the Government.
Since the securities created are treated as gov-
ernment deposits with the central bank, it appears as a 
liability on the balance sheet of the central bank, and 
reduces the volume of net RBI credit to the central 
government, which has, in fact, turned negative. By 
increasing such liabilities subject to the ceiling, the 
RBI can balance increases in its foreign exchange 
assets to differing degrees, controlling the level of 
its assets and, therefore, its liabilities. The money 
absorbed through the sale of these securities is not 
available to the government to finance its expendi-
tures, but is held by the central bank in a separate 
account that can be used only for the redemption 
or buy-back of these securities as part of the RBI’s 
operations. As far as the central government is con-
cerned, while these securities are a capital liability, its 
“deposits” with the central bank are an asset, imply-
ing that the issue of these securities does not make 
any net difference to its capital account, and does not 
contribute to the fiscal deficit. However, the interest 
payable on these securities has to be met by the cen-
tral government and appears in the budget as part of 
the aggregate interest burden. Thus, the greater is the 
degree to which the RBI has to resort to sterilization 
to neutralize the effects of capital inflows, the larger 
is the cost that the government would have to bear, 
by diverting a part of its resources for the purpose.
There are three consequences of these develop-
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that has been de-linked from the fiscal policy initia-
tives of the state, is no more independent. More or 
less autonomous capital flows influence the reserves 
position of the central bank and therefore the level 
of money supply, unless the central bank chooses to 
leave the exchange rate unmanaged, which it cannot. 
This implies that the central bank is not in a posi-
tion to use the monetary lever to influence domestic 
economic variables, however effective those levers 
may be. Secondly, the country is subject to a drain of 
foreign exchange inasmuch as there is a substantial 
difference between the repatriable returns earned by 
foreign investors and the foreign exchange returns 
earned by the RBI from the investment of its reserves 
in relatively liquid assets. Finally, in its effort to bal-
ance the accumulation of foreign exchange assets by 
retrenching government securities deposited with it 
by the central government under the Market Stabiliza-
tion Scheme, the RBI has taken on deposits of such 
securities to the tune of more than Rs 1,800 billion. 
Since the interest due on those securities has to be met 
from the central budget, the Budget for 2007–2008 
had provided for an outgo of Rs 37 billion on this 
account. But the Mid-Year Review estimates that 
interest payments on bonds issued for this purpose 
would amount to Rs 82 billion during financial year 
2007–2008, necessitating a supplementary demand 
of Rs 45 billion. Even more money may have to be 
allocated for the purpose before the next financial 
year. This would make fiscal management difficult 
as well. The outcome may be a further cutback in 
capital and social expenditures.
While partial solutions to this problem can be 
sought in mechanisms like the Market Stabilization 
Scheme, it is now increasingly clear that the real op-
tion in the current situation is to either curb inflows 
of foreign capital or encourage outflows of foreign 
exchange. As the RBI’s survey of monetary man-
agement techniques in emerging market economies 
– reported in its Survey of Currency and Finance 
2003-04 – makes clear, countries have chosen to use 
stringent capital control measures or market-based 
measures, such as differential reserve requirements 
and Tobin-type taxes to restrict capital inflows. 
 
Countries unwilling to opt for capital control 
measures are soon forced to loosen capital outflow 
norms to expend the foreign exchange “acquired” 
through large capital inflows, because of pressures to 
prevent any “unbridled” appreciation of the domestic 
currency. In countries like India, policies adopted 
with this objective include: substantial expansion of 
the permission to use foreign exchange for invest-
ment abroad by Indian residents; greater flexibility 
regarding pre-payment of external commercial bor-
rowings by private sector firms; liberalization of 
“surrender” requirements for exporters, enabling 
them to hold up to 100 per cent of their proceeds 
in foreign currency accounts; extension of foreign 
currency account facilities to other residents, with 
permission to transfer large sums annually for any 
legally permissible expenditure in the host country; 
and allowing banks to liberally invest abroad in high 
quality instruments.
 
Thus, one response to the difficulties countries 
face in managing the recent surge in capital inflows, 
is to move towards greater liberalization of the capital 
account. This only aggravates the problems created 
by excess global liquidity in the first instance.
Iv.  conclusion
To conclude, the evidence is strong that the 
surge in capital flows to developing countries in 
recent years is supply-driven and not warranted by 
the financing needs in these countries. This supply-
side driven surge of capital has three kinds of effects: 
(i) it results in a situation where financial decisions in 
these countries are increasingly made by international 
firms seeking environments and pursuing strategies 
similar to that in their countries of origin, necessi-
tating fundamental changes in financial policies and 
regulatory structures; (ii) it increases financial vulner-
ability in these countries resulting in periodic crisis 
that can have damaging effects on the real economy; 
and (iii) it leads to macroeconomic adjustments that 
reduce the fiscal and monetary autonomy of the 
governments and the central banks in these countries, 
with potentially adverse consequences for economic 
growth. If developing countries want to avoid such 
outcomes in the current environment, the only option 
they have is that of adopting domestic policies that 
restrict the volume and the nature of capital inflows 
into their economies. 22 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 52
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Chart A.1: Movements in the Indian Composite 
Stock Index (Sensex) 
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Chart A.2: Movements in the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange Composite Index 







1/95 1/96 1/97 1/98 1/99 1/00 1/01 1/02 1/03 1/04 1/05 1/06 1/07
Chart A3: Movements in the Korea Stock Exchange 
Stock Price Index
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Chart A.4: Movements in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Composite Index
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Chart A.5: Movements in the Manila Stock 
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Chart A.6: Movements in the Thailand 
SET General Index 
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Notes
 1  Very often, countries not reporting have been characterised 
by small or negligible international exposure of banks 
operating from within their borders. There have been 
exceptions, such as the Republic of Korea which joined 
the countries reporting to the BIS in 2005.
 2  Figures from Bloomberg and Schumer, 2006. 
 3  For example, the wealthiest 1 per cent of Americans report-
edly earned 21.2 per cent of all income in 2005, according 
to data from the Internal Revenue Service. This was an 
increase in share relative to the 19.0 per cent recorded in 
2004, and exceeded the previous high of 20.8 per cent in 
2000, at the peak of the previous bull market in stocks. 
Compared with this, the bottom 50 per cent earned 12.8 per 
cent of all income in 2005, which was less than the 13.4 per 
cent and 13.0 per cent in 2004 and 2000 respectively 
(Ip, 2007).
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